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Abstract
This paper examines simultaneous versus sequential choice of eﬀort in a two-
player contest with a general contest success function. The timing of moves,
determined in a pre-play stage prior to the contest-subgame, as well as the
value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing
models with an exogenously ﬁxed prize the present paper ﬁnds the following.
(1) Players may decide to choose their eﬀort simultaneously in the subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game. (2) The SPE does not need
to be unique, (3) in particular, there is no unique SPE with sequential moves
if costs of eﬀort are exclusively endogenously determined. (4) If the unique
SPE is sequential play, the win probability in the NE is in no way crucial for
the determination of an endogenous leadership. (5) Finally, symmetry among
players does not rule out incentives for precommitment to eﬀort locally away
from the Nash-Cournot level.
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1 Introduction
By providing a framework for analyzing contests with endogenous timing, an endoge-
nously determined prize and a general contest success function (CSF) the present
paper strives to merge two strands of literature. The ﬁrst group of papers focusses
on the distinction between Cournot-Nash equilibria (NE) and Stackelberg equilibria
in contest models with an exogenously ﬁxed prize. The second group of papers is
broadly concerned with the impact of an endogenously determined prize on the NE
of a contest.
Strategic behavior in a two-player contest over a prize of ﬁxed and common value
was ﬁrst explored by Dixit (1987), who uses a logit as well as a probit form of the
CSF.1 He ﬁnds that in a symmetric two-player contest there is no local incentive
to precommit eﬀort away from the Nash-Cournot level. Moreover, he shows that
if two unevenly matched players compete in a sequential manner, it is the favorite
(underdog) who has an incentive to overcommit (undercommit) eﬀort compared to
the NE.2 Two decisive factors are responsible for this ﬁnding. First, the underdog’s
(favorite’s) eﬀort is a strategic complement (substitute) to that of the favorite (un-
derdog), i.e. the underdog’s best response function is downward sloping in the NE
of the game while the favorite’s is upward sloping.3 Second, eﬀorts exhibit negative
externalities, i.e. each player’s payoﬀ is a decreasing function of the competitor’s
eﬀort.4 An important implication of this ﬁnding is that sequential play may increase
or decrease social costs (compared to the NE) contingent on the leader’s win prob-
ability in the NE.
In seminal contributions Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) indepen-
dently extend the Dixit-framework by introducing a preplay stage in which the two
players determine the order of their moves prior to the actual choice of eﬀort. They
show that in the unique SPE of the extended game the favorite (underdog) will never
1The logit form of the CSF expresses the probability of winning as a function of the relative eﬀort
of players (see Loury (1979) and Tullock (1980)). The probit form CSF is used when players
experience some noise components regarding their eﬀective eﬀort (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)
and Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983)).
2According to Dixit (1987) the favorite (underdog) is the player whose odds of victory in a two-
player contest exceed (fall below) one-half at the NE.
3For the case of an oligopoly, the issue of strategic complementarity and substitutability has ﬁrst
been examined by Bulow et al. (1985) and Gal-Or (1985).
4The issue of positive vs. negative externalities is imminently important for the analysis of the
leader’s behavior in a Stackelberg game. See, for instance, Amir (1995) and Eaton (2004).
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(always) move ﬁrst. Hence, players’ voluntary choice of timing leads unambiguously
to a sequential move game which contradicts the rational explanation of a contest
as a simultaneous move game as originated by Tullock (1980). Moreover, because of
the particular order of moves, the unique SPE Pareto-dominates any other sequence
of moves.
A limitation of the previous analysis is the fact that it does not address the conse-
quences of an endogenous prize in a contest, a fact which has attracted increasing
attention over the last two decades. Basically, there are two ways of endogenizing
the value of a prize in a contest. Either (1) the prize itself is a control variable of
the players or (2) the players’ eﬀort indirectly aﬀects the value of the prize.5
An example for the ﬁrst approach is Konrad (2002), where subsequently to the real-
ization of a project, an incumbent decides about his investment in a project as well
as about his eﬀort in a contest in which he has to defend his project returns against
a challenger. Epstein and Nitzan (2004) analyze in a political competition game the
endogenous formation of policies prior to a lobbying contest.6
As opposed to this, we provide a framework which uses the second approach, i.e.
a framework in which the eﬀort exerted by a player aﬀects the distribution as well
as the value of the prize. Depending on whether the costs of eﬀort are assumed to
be exclusively or only partially endogenously determined, we distinguish between
general and partial equilibrium models, or synonymously, between conﬂict models
and rent-seeking models.7
A Cournot-Nash type example of a conﬂict model is Hirshleifer (1991), where, in a
state-of-nature, two agents are endowed with an inalienable resource which can be
used as an input in a valuable prize (production) or for appropriation. Since eﬀec-
tive property rights are absent, the contestants face a trade-oﬀ between production
and appropriation. He ﬁnds that in the NE the poorer player, deﬁned with respect
5We do not address the issue of artiﬁcially created contest, where the contest designer selects the
value of the prize awarded to fulﬁll a speciﬁc goal. See for example Moldovanu and Sela (2001),
and Che and Gale (2003).
6See also Leidy (1994), who argues that a monopolist whose right is contested in a political market
will spend lobbying eﬀort and lower his price to defuse reformist opposition, and Hoﬀmann (2010),
who shows in a two-player conﬂict model that the anticipation of potential appropriation forces
agents to engage in trade, since this mutually reduces the gains from appropriation.
7A recent survey on rent-seeking models is provided by Congleton et al., eds (2008), whereas
Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) present a systematic and comprehensive review of conﬂict models.
See also Neary (1997) for a discussion on both concepts.
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to the value of the initial resource, will catch up to the richer player due to the
fact that each player uses his comparative advantage. In a comparable framework
Skaperdas (1992) ﬁnds that contingent on the properties of the CSF, cooperation is
not incommensurate with the lack of exogenously enforced property rights in a one-
shot contest. In a related model Bevia´ and Corcho´n (2010) show that cooperation
can be achieved by compensating the poorer player in order to avoid open conﬂict.8
An example of a rent-seeking model with an endogenous prize is Baye et al. (2005),
who use an all-pay auction framework in order to compare diﬀerent litigation sys-
tems. Here, diﬀerent legal systems are based on diﬀerent fee-shifting rules, which
determine the value of the net-prize of the contest winner and looser contingent on
their expenditures on legal representation. Another example is Shaﬀer (2006) who
discusses positive and negative externalities of eﬀort on the value of the prize. An
example for the latter are territorial disputes, an example for the former are labor
tournaments.9
The question we pose is whether the ﬁndings of Baik and Shogren (1992) and
Leininger (1993) are generalizable beyond ﬁxed prizes. Therefore, in order to unite
contests with endogenous timing and with an endogenous prize, we provide a frame-
work of a two-player contest under complete information, given a general production
technology of the prize, and a general CSF. The extended game consists of a contest
subgame and a pre-play stage in which players decide whether to exert eﬀort as soon
as or as late as possible. Subsequently, agents choose eﬀort in the contest subgame
according to their previous decision. Thus, the timing game matches the extended
game with observable delay by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) frequently used in games
of endogenous timing.10 No matter when exerted, the players’ eﬀort inﬂuences not
only the win probability of both players but also the value of the prize. We will
assume throughout the analysis that eﬀort has a negative impact on the value of
8See also Anbarci et al. (2002), who compare various bargaining solutions. Here, bargaining takes
place in the shadow of conﬂict, i.e. players have to make irreversible outlays before the bargain
procedure. These investments not only alter a player’s disagreement payoﬀ but also the output
subject to bargain. Dynamic conﬂict games are provided by Hirshleifer (1995), Grossman and
Kim (1995), Hafer (2006), and Gonzales and Neary (2008).
9Early examples are provided, inter alia, by Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) who present a rent-seeking
model of hostile take-overs of public companies. Here, anti-takeover strategies, such as the poison
pill, diminish the target’s stock (the prize). Chung (1996) shows that promotional eﬀort increases
the market share of a ﬁrm as well as the size of the whole market. Thus, eﬀort-spending does
have a positive externality on the combatant.
10See for example Amir and Grilo (1999), Normann (2002), and Amir and Stepanova (2006).
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the prize and allow the costs of eﬀort to be exclusively or only partially endoge-
nously determined. Based on these assumptions we are able to provide solutions
for rent-seeking and conﬂict games.11 We examine how the endogeneity of the prize
will inﬂuence the players’ timing decision. In particular, we provide a taxonomy of
endogenous timing based on the properties of the players’ best response functions
as well as on the characteristics of the prize-production technology. Hence, in a
methodological sense, the paper is close to Kempf and Rota Graziosi (2009) who
develop an endogenous timing game in which two countries provide public goods
with spillovers. Here, a taxonomy is proposed depending on the sign of spillovers
among countries and the nature of the strategic interaction between various public
goods.
It is found, in line with Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993), that the
SPE of the extended game is Pareto dominated by no other sequential or simulta-
neous play payoﬀ; and that, if sequential play emerges in equilibrium, the leader
commits lower eﬀort than in the NE. However, unlike the aforementioned literature,
the present paper ﬁnds the following. (1) In the SPE of the extended game, players
may decide to choose eﬀort simultaneously, which partly reinforces the argument
put forth by Tullock (1980) regarding the rational of a contest as a simultaneous
move game. (2) The SPE of the extended game does not need to be unique. (3)
In particular, there is no unique SPE with sequential moves if costs are exclusively
endogenously determined. Hence, in a general equilibrium setting it is impossible to
replicate the ﬁndings of Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993). (4) If the
unique SPE is sequential play, the win probability in the NE is in no way crucial
for the determination of an endogenous leadership. This shows that in our setting
it is possible for the favorite to become a Stackelberg-leader and the underdog to
become a Stackelberg-follower. (5) Finally, contrary to Dixit (1987), we prove that
in a symmetric game Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria typically do not co-
incide, i.e. there are local commitment incentives for players.
The underlying reason for the diﬀerences in the strategic incentives in our model
compared to the Dixit-framework is that in the latter costs of eﬀort are exclusively
11Note that if in a general equilibrium model the prize reacted positive to eﬀort, the resulting
Cournot-Nash equilibrium would be a corner solution, since the win probability as well as the
prize increases in eﬀort for both players and exogenously given costs of eﬀort are, by deﬁnition,
absent.
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private costs, i.e. apart from the CSF, there is no additional negative externality
stemming from the use of eﬀort. Thus, the marginal payoﬀ of a player does not
depend on the marginal costs of his competitor. On the contrary, costs of eﬀort in
the present model are at least partially common costs, meaning that they have to
be borne by both players. These additional negative externalities arise as a result of
the endogenous prize assumption and may represent the opportunity costs of eﬀort
measured in terms of foregone production possibilities in a conﬂict framework. Or,
in a rent-seeking framework, they may represent the negative responsiveness of the
prize at hand to the eﬀort exerted. Accordingly, common costs reshape the strategic
incentives in the NE, compared to the private cost scenario.
Before introducing our model, it should certainly be emphasized that we are not
the ﬁrst to undertake the program of generalizing the ﬁndings of Baik and Shogren
(1992) and Leininger (1993). However, almost all papers make the assumption of
an exogenous prize. For example Yildirim (2005) prescinds from the feature that
each player can only move once. Endogenous timing in contests with asymmetric
information and a lottery CSF is studied by Fu (2006). Konrad and Leininger (2007)
study endogenous sequencing in a 𝑛-player all-pay contest with complete informa-
tion. Finally Kolmar (2008) analyzes the emergence of perfectly secure property
rights in a stylized two-player conﬂict model. Although, as in the present paper,
the prize is allowed to be endogenous, its value is contingent only on the eﬀort of
one player. Moreover, he does not address the question of endogenous timing in a
rent-seeking framework and does not provide a taxonomy of endogenous leadership
for the case of a general CSF and a general production technology.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and explores the
nature of strategic substitutes vs. complements in our setting and its inﬂuence on
the players’ ﬁrst-mover and second-mover advantages. Furthermore, it describes the
equilibrium concepts used in the paper. Section 3 provides the equilibria in the full
game and the taxonomy of endogenous leadership; we conclude in section 4.
2 The model
Consider a situation in which each of two players exert eﬀort (𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ+) in order to
win a prize of common value, with 𝑖 = 1, 2. The prize is allowed to be endogenous, i.e.
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its value is contingent on the vector x = (𝑥1, 𝑥2). The prize-production technology
𝑉 (x) has the following properties.12
Assumption 1 (Prize-production technology)
𝑉𝑖 (x) ≡ ∂𝑉 (x)
∂𝑥𝑖
< 0, (1a)
𝑉𝑖𝑖 (x) ≡ ∂
2𝑉 (x)
∂𝑥2𝑖
< 0. (1b)
Assumptions (1a) and (1b) state that an increase in eﬀort decreases the prize and
that this negative eﬀect increases in 𝑥𝑖. Note that the marginal productivity with
respect to 𝑥𝑖 might diﬀer for the two players, i.e. 𝑉1 (x) ⪌ 𝑉2 (x). Moreover, note
that we allow for 𝑞−substitutes and 𝑞−complements, i.e., we do not restrict the sign
of the cross derivatives of the prize-production technology
(
𝑉12 (x) ≡ ∂2𝑉 (x)∂𝑥1∂𝑥2 ⪌ 0
)
.13
Thus, if 𝑉12(x) > 0, then an increase in player 𝑖’s eﬀort will decrease the (negative)
marginal eﬀect of player 𝑗’s eﬀort on the prize.
Example 1 (A conﬂict framework)
For example in Skaperdas (1992) each of two players possesses 𝑅𝑖 units of an inalienable
primary resource which can be used to produce one-to-one two kinds of inputs, 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖,
where the latter will be used in the joint production of a single consumption good represent-
ing the prize while the former will be used as an input in the appropriative competition.
Implementing the individual budget-constraint (𝑅𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖+𝑦𝑖) and assuming a Cobb-Douglas
type of production function, we get 𝑉 (x) = (𝑅1 − 𝑥1)𝛼 (𝑅2 − 𝑥2)1−𝛼, with 𝑅𝑖 ∈ ℝ+ and
𝛼 ∈ (0, 1). This leads to 𝑉12(x) > 0.
Next, we turn to the CSF, 𝑝𝑖 : 𝑥𝑖 × 𝑥𝑗 → [0, 1], which determines for any given
value of the vector x player 𝑖’s probability of winning the prize.14 As a notational
simpliﬁcation we introduce 𝑝(x) as the win probability of player 1 and 1 − 𝑝(x) as
player 2’s win probability. The function 𝑝(x) exhibits the following properties.
12The subscript 𝑖 (𝑗) denotes the partial derivative with respect to 𝑥𝑖 (𝑥𝑗).
13The terms 𝑞−substitutes and 𝑞−complements have been suggested by Hicks (1956, p. 156).
In the contest literature several speciﬁcations have been proposed with respect to the prize:
Dixit (1987), Baik and Shogren (1992) and Grossman (2001) consider exogenous rents (𝑉 (x) =
𝐾), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1998) consider an endogenous rent, with 𝑉12(x) = 0, whereas
Hirshleifer (1991) and Skaperdas (1992) assume 𝑞−complements (𝑉12 (x) > 0).
14To avoid repetition, we use 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2 and 𝑖 ∕= 𝑗 when it’s obvious.
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Assumption 2 (Contest success function)
𝑝1 (x) ≡ ∂𝑝 (x)
∂𝑥1
> 0 and 𝑝2 (x) ≡ ∂𝑝 (x)
∂𝑥2
< 0, (2a)
𝑝11 (x) ≡ ∂
2𝑝 (x)
∂𝑥21
< 0 and 𝑝22 (x) ≡ ∂
2𝑝 (x)
∂𝑥22
> 0, (2b)
𝑝12 (x) (1− 𝑝 (x)) 𝑝 (x)− 𝑝2 (x) 𝑝1 (x) (1− 2𝑝 (x)) = 0. (2c)
Assumptions (2a) and (2b) show that each players win probability is an increasing
(decreasing) and concave (convex) function of his own (his competitor’s) eﬀort.
Assumption (2c) is a technical one which allows us to simplify the analysis for the
proof of the uniqueness of the NE.15
The payoﬀ function of player 1 and 2 are given by
Π1 (x) = 𝑝(x) 𝑉 (x)− 𝐶1(𝑥1), (3.1)
Π2 (x) = (1− 𝑝(x))𝑉 (x)− 𝐶2(𝑥2), (3.2)
where 𝐶 𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0, and 𝐶 𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0. Each agent maximizes his expected payoﬀ which
equals the prize that goes to the sole winner, weighted by the probability that he wins
the contest minus the sure eﬀort cost. These eﬀort costs are allowed to be zero.16
We remark that the agents’ objective functions have two kinds of properties. First,
these functions exhibit plain substitutes as deﬁned by Eaton (2004). Therefore, the
sign of the cross derivatives of the payoﬀ function is negative, i.e., we have negative
15It is similar to assumption (3) in (Skaperdas, 1992, p. 725). It is worth noting that assumption
(2) is fulﬁlled by any logit form CSF represented by the function
𝑝(x) =
{
𝑓1(𝑥1)
𝑓1(𝑥1)+𝑓2(𝑥2)
, if x ∕= 0,
1
2 , if x = 0,
as long as each player’s impact function 𝑓 : ℝ+ → ℝ+ is a twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and
concave function. The same holds for any probit form CSF,
𝑝(x) = 𝐺 (𝑓1(𝑥1)− 𝑓2(𝑥2)) ,
where 𝐺 represents the cumulative density function of the diﬀerence in the noise components
(𝜖1 − 𝜖2).
16For 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) = 0 the present model describes a conﬂict model, i.e. a model in which the marginal
costs of eﬀort are exclusively endogenously determined.
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spillovers with respect to the eﬀort invested:
Π12(x) ≡
∂Π1(x)
∂𝑥2
= 𝑝2(x) 𝑉 (x) + 𝑝(x) 𝑉2(x) < 0, (4.1)
Π21(x) ≡
∂Π2(x)
∂𝑥1
= −𝑝1(x)𝑉 (x) + (1− 𝑝(x))𝑉2(x) < 0. (4.2)
A second property concerns the strategic interactions among agents’ eﬀorts. Follow-
ing Bulow et al. (1985), we will say that eﬀorts are strategic substitutes (SS) for
agent 𝑖 if his marginal payoﬀ decreases in the eﬀort of player 𝑗, and they are strategic
complements (SC) if agent 𝑖’s marginal payoﬀ increases in agent 𝑗’s eﬀort. Due to
the properties of the CSF, the players’ marginal payoﬀ depend in a non-monotonic
way on the competitor’s eﬀort. Following Dixit (1987) we thus deﬁne SS and SC in
the neighborhood of the NE.
2.1 Eﬀorts in the three basic games
Now, we consider the three basic games; the Cournot-Nash game (Γ𝑁) and the two
Stackelberg games, depending on whether agent 1 or agent 2 leads (Γ𝑆1 or Γ𝑆2). The
NE of the contest subgame
(
Γ𝑁
)
is deﬁned by the following system of maximization
programs ⎧⎨⎩
𝑥𝑁𝑖 ≡ argmax
𝑥𝑖
Π𝑖(x), 𝑥𝑁𝑗 given,
𝑥𝑁𝑗 ≡ argmax
𝑥𝑗
Π𝑗(x), 𝑥𝑁𝑖 given.
(5)
The FOCs for players 1 and 2 are therefore evaluated at x𝑁 , which denotes the NE
values
(
x𝑁 ≡ (𝑥𝑁1 , 𝑥𝑁2 )).17 The FOCs for player 1 and 2 are therefore
𝑝1
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉
(
x𝑁
)
+ 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉1
(
x𝑁
)− 𝐶11(𝑥𝑁1 ) = 0, (6.1)
−𝑝2
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉
(
x𝑁
)
+
(
1− 𝑝 (x𝑁))𝑉2 (x𝑁)− 𝐶22(𝑥𝑁2 ) = 0. (6.2)
In order to establish the uniqueness of the NE we need the following assumption.18
17In a similar way, we will note x𝑆𝑖 ≡ (𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝐿𝑖 )) the levels of eﬀort at the Stackelberg equilib-
rium in which player 𝑖 leads.
18It is worth noting that a less strict assumption is needed if the uniqueness of the NE is to be
proven, when 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) = 0 for both players. Then the assumption needed is given by
𝑉11
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉22
(
x𝑁
) ≥ (𝑉12 (x𝑁))2 ,
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Assumption 3
(
𝑝
(
x𝑁
))2
𝑉11
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉22
(
x𝑁
) ≥ (𝑝 (x𝑁) 𝑉12 (x𝑁))2 (7)
with 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
= max
{
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
, 1− 𝑝 (x𝑁)} and 𝑝 (x𝑁) = min{𝑝 (x𝑁) , 1− 𝑝 (x𝑁)}.
Now we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Under assumptions (1), (2), and (3) the Nash equilibrium of the Cournot-Nash game
(Γ𝑁) exists and is unique.
We now turn to the issue of strategic incentives in the NE of the contest subgame.
Applying the Envelope theorem to (6), it is easy to show that
𝑑𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= −Π
𝑗
𝑖𝑗(x)
Π𝑗𝑗𝑗(x)
⪋ 0⇔ Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x) ⪋ 0,
i.e., the sign of the slope of agent 𝑖’s best response function at a point in the strategy
space is solely determined by the cross eﬀect on the marginal payoﬀ function which
- as was said earlier - may vary. However, uniqueness of the NE implicates that our
deﬁnition of strategic interaction (SS or SC) is unique for each player. Implementing
the FOC in each player’s cross derivative of the payoﬀ function yields:
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
= 𝑝 𝑉12(x
𝑁 ) + Ω(x𝑁 ), (8.1)
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
= (1− 𝑝)𝑉12(x𝑁 )− Ω(x𝑁 ), (8.2)
with
Ω(x𝑁 ) =
𝑝1(x
𝑁 )𝐶22(𝑥
𝑁
2 )
1− 𝑝(x𝑁) +
𝑝2(x
𝑁)𝐶11(𝑥
𝑁
1 )
𝑝(x𝑁)
. (9)
These conditions state that the sum of the cross eﬀects on the marginal payoﬀ
function equals the cross derivatives of the production function, i.e. Π112(x
𝑁) +
Π212(x
𝑁) ≡ 𝑉12(x𝑁). Since 𝑉12(x) ⪌ 0, we have three diﬀerent cases. A game of
SC (Π𝑖12
(
x𝑁
) ∈ ℝ+), which is only consistent with 𝑞-complements (𝑉12 (x𝑁) > 0)
and a game of SS (Π𝑖12
(
x𝑁
) ∈ ℝ−), which is only consistent with 𝑞-substitutes
(𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)
< 0). The mixed case (Π𝑗12
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 > Π𝑖12
(
x𝑁
)
) emerges with either
which corresponds to the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale in production by
Skaperdas (1992).
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𝑞-substitutes or 𝑞-complements and it is also the only case that is consistent with
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)
= 0. Note that Ω
(
x𝑁
)
= 0 if 𝐶 𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 0, i.e. in a conﬂict model the
strategic incentives of both players are always aligned and depend solely on 𝑉12(x
𝑁).
Hence, given a symmetric game and 𝑉12
(
x𝑁
) ∕= 0, there are local commitment
incentives, which contradicts (Dixit, 1987, p. 893).19
Example 1 (A conﬂict framework - continued)
Let us assume that the game is symmetric. In particular, let us assume that we have a
speciﬁc type of logit form CSF, a Tullock CSF, with 𝑝(𝑥) =
𝑥𝑟1
𝑥𝑟1 + 𝑥
𝑟
2
and 𝑟 ∈ (0, 1]. The
prize-production technology exhibits equal marginal productivity of both factors (𝛼 = 12),
and 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 = 𝑅. The symmetric NE gives us 𝑥
𝑁
1 = 𝑥
𝑁
2 =
𝑟 𝑅
1+𝑟 and Π
1
12(x
𝑁 ) =
Π212(x
𝑁 ) = 1+𝑟8𝑅 . Hence, in this symmetric conﬂict model both players regard eﬀort as SC.
Next, we would like to compare our result to the ﬁndings associated with the Dixit-
framework. If the prize is assumed to be exogenously ﬁxed and equal to 𝐾 > 0,
then
Π112(x
𝑁 ) = −Π212 = 𝑝12(x𝑁)𝐾. (10)
Accordingly, either 𝑝12(x
𝑁) = 0 and the strategic incentives are aligned and equal to
zero, or 𝑝12(x
𝑁) ∕= 0, then the strategic incentives are directly opposed. Moreover,
given a logit or probit form of the CSF
𝑝
(
x𝑁
) { >
=
<
}
1
2
⇔ 𝑝12
(
x𝑁
) { >
=
<
}
0. (11)
Hence, as stated by Dixit (1987), the favorite’s (underdog’s) eﬀort is SS (SC) to the
underdog’s (favorite’s) eﬀort.20 This no longer holds if we introduce an endogenous
prize. Then, the probability of winning the contest has to be distinguished from
19We do not examine the case where Π112(x) = Π
2
12(x) = 0 as further restrictions on the third
derivatives of the CSF would be required to establish whether there are local commitment incen-
tives in this case, which is beyond the scope of this paper (see Dixit (1999) and Baye and Shin
(1999)).
20For the case of a logit type CSF, we get
𝑝12
(
x𝑁
)
=
𝑓 ′1
(
𝑥𝑁1
)
𝑓 ′2
(
𝑥𝑁2
)(
𝑓1
(
𝑥𝑁1
)
+ 𝑓2
(
𝑥𝑁2
))3 (𝑓1 (𝑥𝑁1 )− 𝑓2 (𝑥𝑁2 )) ,
for the case of a probit type CSF, we get
𝑝12(x
𝑁 ) = −𝑔′(𝑓1(𝑥𝑁1 )− 𝑓2(𝑥𝑁2 ))(𝑓 ′1(𝑥𝑁1 ) 𝑓 ′2(𝑥𝑁2 )),
where g is the density associated with G.
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local commitment incentives.
Example 2 (A rent-seeking framework)
Assume that 𝑉 (x) = 10 − (4 𝑥1)2 − (𝑥2)2 so that 𝑉12(x) = 0. Moreover, we use a CSF of the
logit type and assume that 𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖, which leads, given eq. (8), to Π
1(x𝑁 ) = −Π2(x𝑁 ) =
Ω(x𝑁 ) =
𝑓 ′1(𝑥1)−𝑓 ′2(𝑥2)
𝑓1(𝑥1)+𝑓2(𝑥2)
. In particular assume that 𝑓1(𝑥1) = 2 𝑥1, 𝑓2(𝑥2) = 𝑥2, so that Ω(x) > 0, ∀
x > 0. Hence, eﬀorts are SC (SS) for player 1 (2), which solely depends on player 1’s advantage
with respect to the impact function 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖). The eﬀort levels in the NE are 𝑥
𝑁
1 ≈ 0.3309 and
𝑥𝑁2 ≈ 0.8959, hence 𝑝12(x𝑁 ) ≈ −0.1239, showing that player 1 is the underdog, which contradicts
Dixit (1987). The reason for this is that although player 1 is more eﬀective with regards to the
impact factor this advantage is overcompensated with respect to the value of the CSF in the NE by
the fact that 𝑉1(𝑥)≪ 𝑉2(𝑥). Thus, player 1’s deeper impact on the prize leads to 𝑓2(𝑥𝑁2 ) > 𝑓1(𝑥𝑁1 )
and consequently to 𝑝12(x
𝑁 ) < 0.
Next, we turn to the sequential move games.21 The subgame perfect equilibrium
of the contest subgame (the Stackelberg equilibrium) is determined by applying
backward induction. Thus, in the game where agent 𝑖 leads (Γ𝑆𝑖), we ﬁrst focus
on the follower’s (𝐹 ) maximization program which is 𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖) ≡ argmax
𝑥𝑗
Π𝑗(x). This
yields
Π𝑗𝑗
(
𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖), 𝑥𝑖
)
= 0. (12)
We assume that the second order condition of the leader’s maximization program
holds. In particular, we assume that
Assumption 4
𝑑2Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
)
𝑑𝑥2𝑖
< 0.
This assumption is crucial, since it assures the existence and uniqueness of the
Stackelberg equilibrium, where the latter property guarantees that the sign of the
slope of a player’s best response function at the NE is equal to the sign of the slope
of the same player’s best response function, once he becomes a Stackelberg follower
in a sequential move game.
2.2 Eﬀort ranking
Given the optimizing behavior in the basic games, we are now in the position to
establish the rankings of the levels of eﬀort in the diﬀerent equilibria. We distinguish
21We are aware of the fact that given assumptions (1) and (2) we cannot rule out corner solutions
for the sequential move games. This topic has been analyzed, for example, by Grossman and
Kim (1995). However, we will assume only interior solutions for the sequential move games.
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two lemmas since each relies on a speciﬁc characteristic of our framework. Lemma
(2) is a direct consequence of the plain substitutes of eﬀorts (cf. equations 4), lemma
(3) results from the strict concavity of the leaders payoﬀ function (assumption 4).
Lemma 2
Under assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4) the levels of eﬀorts for the Nash and
Stackelberg games are such that
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} , 𝑥𝑁𝑖 > 𝑥𝐹𝑖 .
Lemma (2) states that, independent of the strategic interaction (SS or SC), the
follower will always choose a level of eﬀort which is lower, compared to the eﬀort
exerted by the same player in the NE.22
Lemma 3
Under assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4) the level of eﬀort for the Nash and
Stackelberg games are such that
Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0⇔ 𝑥𝑁𝑖 > 𝑥𝐿𝑖 ,
Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0⇔ 𝑥𝑁𝑖 < 𝑥𝐿𝑖 .
Our second result compares the eﬀort exerted by the Stackelberg leader with the
one exerted in the NE of the contest subgame. If eﬀorts of player 𝑖 are SC (SS) for
player 𝑗, the Stackelberg-leader 𝑖 reduces (increases) his eﬀort compared to the one
in the NE.
To resume, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium levels of eﬀort in both Stackelberg games
are lower than the one obtained at the NE (𝑥𝑁𝑖 > 𝑥
𝐿
𝑖 and 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 > 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 ) if eﬀorts are SC
for both players. Here, the leader, say agent 1, undercommits his eﬀort relative to
his eﬀort in the NE, which induces the follower, agent 2, to decrease his own eﬀort
because of the SC property. In turn, this increases the leader’s payoﬀ because of the
plain substitutes property. In the case of SS for both players, the ranking of eﬀort is
unambiguously corresponding to 𝑥𝐿𝑖 > 𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 > 𝑥
𝐹
𝑖 . The leader overcommits his eﬀort
compared to the NE, which induces the follower to decrease his eﬀort because of
the SS property. Finally, in the mixed game (Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
), we obtain
that player 𝑗 overcommits eﬀort compared to the NE (𝑥𝐿𝑗 > 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 ), whereas player 𝑖
22For the rest of the paper, we pose 𝑥𝐹𝑗 ≡ 𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝐿𝑖 ).
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undercommits eﬀort (𝑥𝐿𝑖 < 𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 ).
2.3 First-mover/Second-mover advantage and incentive
Given these rankings, we can now compare the payoﬀs in the three basic games (Γ𝑁 ,
Γ𝑆1 and Γ𝑆2), which will give us the opportunity of detecting potential ﬁrst-mover
(second-mover) advantages or ﬁrst-mover (second-mover) incentives, which we need
for our last lemma. We deﬁne these concepts as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (First-mover (second-mover) advantage)
Player 𝑖 has a{
ﬁrst-mover advantage
second-mover advantage
}
⇔ Π𝑖 (x𝑆𝑖) { >
<
}
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑗
)
.
Next, we compare the payoﬀs in the NE to the one obtained in the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 (First-mover (second-mover) incentive)
Player 𝑖 has a{
ﬁrst-mover incentive
second-mover incentive
}
⇔
{
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑖
)
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑗
) } ≥ Π𝑖 (x𝑁) .
It is worth noting that whatever the nature of strategic interactions (SC or SS)
might be, players always have a ﬁrst-mover incentive, that is they weakly prefer
their leader payoﬀ over their payoﬀ in the NE
(
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑖
) ≥ Π𝑖 (x𝑁)). This result
holds for a continuous strategy spaces and follows from the deﬁnition of the leader’s
maximization program. From lemmas (2) and (3) follows the last lemma.
Lemma 4
Under assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4) we have:
1. If eﬀorts of player 𝑗 are strategic complements for player 𝑖 at the Nash equi-
librium
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁) > 0
)
, then player 𝑖 has a second-mover incentive:
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑗
)
> Π𝑖
(
x𝑁
)
.
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2. If eﬀorts of player 𝑗 are strategic substitutes for player 𝑖 at the Nash equilibrium(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁 ) < 0
)
, then player 𝑖 has a ﬁrst-mover advantage:
Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑖
)
> Π𝑖
(
x𝑆𝑗
)
.
If eﬀorts are SC for player 𝑖, player 𝑗 reduces his level of eﬀort at the Stackelberg
equilibrium in which he leads, compared to the NE (see lemma (3)). This increases
the payoﬀ of player 𝑖 due to the property of plain substitute and induces the second-
mover incentive. If eﬀorts are SS for player 𝑖, we unambiguously have 𝑥𝐿𝑗 > 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 ,
and then player 𝑖 prefers leading over following due to the negative externality of
player 𝑗’s eﬀort.
An interesting point of the preceding lemma is that we establish a second-mover
incentive or a ﬁrst-mover advantage for player 𝑖 depending only on the concept of
strategic complementarity or, respectively, strategic substitutability of eﬀorts for
player 𝑗 at the NE; that is without assuming monotonicity of the best response
function. It is actually natural that the slope of the best response function of the
opponent determines in ﬁne the existence of a ﬁrst-mover/second-mover incentive or
advantage. For instance, SC of eﬀorts for player 𝑗 at the NE transforms a decrease
of player 𝑖’s eﬀort into an incentive for player 𝑗 to reduce his eﬀorts, which beneﬁts
player 𝑖 since eﬀorts are plain substitutes.
3 Selecting a leader through a timing game
The issue of endogenous timing is examined according to the concept proposed by
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) in their extended game with observable delay. This
extended game Γ˜ allows players to choose non-cooperatively and simultaneously
their eﬀort in a preplay stage either as soon as or as late as possible. The set of
possible pure strategies of player 𝑖 is 𝑎𝑖 ∈ {e, l}, where e ≡ early and l ≡ late. Their
decision is announced by the players subsequently. In the consecutive basic game
(Γ𝑘, with 𝑘 = {𝑁, 𝑆1, 𝑆2}) the players choose their eﬀort according to their timing
decision to which they are committed. Thus, the basic game consists of the diﬀerent
constituent games: Γ𝑁 if the strategy proﬁle 𝑎 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2} = {l, l} or 𝑎 = {e, e},
Γ𝑆1 for 𝑎 = {e, l}, and Γ𝑆2 for 𝑎 = {l, e}. Thus, if players decide to choose eﬀort
at diﬀerent times, the player who chooses to move late observes the eﬀort exerted
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by the player who chose to move early and acts accordingly.23 It is worth noting
that the order of moves does not aﬀect the payoﬀs which are conditional only on
the players’ strategies.
The normal form representation of the pre-contest stage is shown in table 1.24 Here,
x𝑁 = (𝑥𝑁1 , 𝑥
𝑁
2 ) and x
Si = (𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 ).
Player 2
e l
Player 1 e Π1(x𝑁),Π2(x𝑁 ) Π1(xS1),Π2(xS1)
l Π1(xS2),Π2(xS2) Π1(x𝑁),Π2(x𝑁)
Table 1
Normal form representation of Γ˜
3.1 Solutions to the leadership problem
The solution to this reduced form game is equivalent to characterizing the solution
to the leadership problem. There is no leader if both players choose the same action;
a leader emerges when they choose complementary roles. We obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 5
Under assumptions (1), (2), (3), and (4) we have:
1. If eﬀorts are strategic complements for both players
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0
)
, the sub-
game perfect equilibria are the two Stackelberg equilibria,
2. if eﬀorts are strategic substitutes for both players
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0
)
, the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium,
3. if Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is the
Stackelberg equilibrium with player 𝑖 as Stackelberg-leader and player 𝑗 as
Stackelberg-follower.
23Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and Amir and Stepanova (2006), we restrict our attention
to the SPE of Γ˜.
24We remark that the literature on endogenous timing remains divided about how to qualify the
situation where both players choose to lead. Indeed, Dowrick (1986) and more recently Damme
and Hurkens (1999) consider Stackelberg warfare where both countries apply their action as a
leader. In contrast, Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) or Amir and Stepanova (2006) apprehend this
situation as the static Nash game. They emphasize that Stackelberg warfare can occur only
through error, since the underlying strategy of one player is inconsistent with the other player’s
strategy (Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990, p. 42).
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In the ﬁrst case
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁 ) > 0
)
, both players have a second-mover incentive. Given
the fact that the leader’s payoﬀ is always higher than the payoﬀ in the NE, a
coordination game results with two pure strategy Nash equilibria, Γ𝑆1 and Γ𝑆2.
To solve this issue we utilize the equilibrium selection concept of risk dominance
of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). It allows us to select an equilibrium as long as
the game is not symmetric. This criterion consists into a minimization of the risk
of a coordination failure due to strategic uncertainty.25 As stressed by Amir and
Stepanova (2006), a resolution for risk-dominance is not possible without using a
precise speciﬁcation of the problem. Hence, an example follows.
Example 3 (Another conﬂict framework)
As before, we will use a Skaperdas-type of conﬂict model, i.e. each player is endowed 𝑅𝑖 units
of a resource which can be used for production or appropriation. Moreover, we assume that the
CSF is of the logit type with 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖, and the prize-production technology is given by 𝑉 (𝑥) =√
(𝑅1 − 2 𝑥1)
√
(𝑅2 − 𝑥2). If, additionally, 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 = 10 then the level of eﬀorts in NE are given
by 𝑥𝑁1 ≈ 2.7539 and 𝑥𝑁2 = 4.3628, so that 𝑝12
(
x𝑁
)
< 0. Since 𝑉12(x) > 0 we thus have a game of
SC where player 2 is the favorite. According to proposition (5) the SPEs of the extended game are
the two Stackelberg equilibria, so that we have a game of coordination in the preplay stage.
e l
e 1.9473, 3.0849 2.0034, 3.8099
l 2.4030, 3.1343 1.9473, 3.0849
Table 2
Payoﬀs in the 3rd example
Utilizing the risk-dominance concept allows us to select an equilibrium. In our framework, the
SPE Γ𝑆1 risk-dominates Γ𝑆2 if the former is associated with the larger product of deviation losses,
denoted by Δ. More formally, Γ𝑆1 ≻
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
Γ𝑆2 ⇔ Δ > 0, with
Δ ≡ (Π1 (x𝑆1)−Π1 (x𝑁)) (Π2 (x𝑆1)−Π2 (x𝑁))− (Π1 (x𝑆2)−Π1 (x𝑁)) (Π2 (x𝑆2)−Π2 (x𝑁 )) .
Given the payoﬀs in the three diﬀerent games (cf. table (2)) we thus obtain Δ ≈ 0.0182 > 0, or
equivalently, we ﬁnd that the SPE in which player 1 leads risk-dominates the other SPE.
In the second part of proposition (5)
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁) < 0
)
both players have a ﬁrst-mover
advantage and prefer their simultaneous play payoﬀ over their Stackelberg-follower
25This uncertainty comes from the fact that a player is always unsure of the other player’s move
because of the multiplicity of solutions. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) deﬁned the risk-dominance
as follows: An equilibrium risk-dominates another equilibrium when the former is less risky than
the latter, that is the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one for which the product of the deviation
losses is the largest.
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payoﬀ. Thus, both players have the dominant strategy early which leads to a
Cournot-Nash game (Γ𝑁).
In the third case (Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
) player 𝑖, who has a ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage, prefers his NE payoﬀ over his follower payoﬀ and has therefore a dominant
strategy (early). Player 𝑗, on the other hand, has a second-mover incentive, that
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12(x
𝑁) > 0 𝑉12(x
𝑁) < 0 𝑉12(x
𝑁) = 0
> 0
Both
players
may lead
if
𝑉12(x
𝑁 ) < Π112(x
𝑁)
1 follows
2 leads
if
𝑉12(x
𝑁) > Π112(x
𝑁 )
1 follows, 2 leads
1 follows
2 leads
< 0 1 leads, 2 follows
no
player
leads
if
𝑉12(x
𝑁) > Π112(x
𝑁 )
1 leads,
2 follows
if
𝑉12(x
𝑁) < Π112(x
𝑁)
1 leads
2 follows
Table 3
A taxonomy of endogenous leadership
is he prefers his follower payoﬀ over his NE payoﬀ. Therefore, given the dominant
strategy of his opponent, player 𝑗 chooses late, so that the unique solution to the
timing game is Γ𝑆𝑖.
Applying proposition (5) we now provide a taxonomy of endogenous leadership
based on the properties of the prize-production technology (in particular, the sign of
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)
) as well as on the sign of the slope of both players’ best response functions
in the NE, presented in table 3. It shows that we might ﬁnd in equilibrium that either
the favorite chooses eﬀort simultaneously with his competitor, or that the favorite
may lead. The former case will emerge if {Π112
(
x𝑁
)
, 𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)} ∈ ℝ− and 𝑉12 (x𝑁) >
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
. The latter case may emerge if, for example, {Π112
(
x𝑁
)
, 𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)} ∈ ℝ+
and 𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)
> Π112
(
x𝑁
)
.26
From proposition (5), we may deduce the following corollary.
26Without speciﬁcation of, for instance, the prize-production technology, it is unclear whether the
favorite leads or follows in this case.
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Corollary 6 (Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and rent dissipation)
Every SPE of the extended game Γ˜ is Pareto undominated, although rent dissipation
might be higher than in non-SPE. More precisely,
(1) if both players regard their eﬀort as SC
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁) > 0
)
, both subgame perfect
equilibria (Γ𝑆1 and Γ𝑆2) Pareto-dominate the NE. Moreover, the levels of eﬀort
for the Nash and Stackelberg games are such that 𝑥𝑁𝑖 + 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 > 𝑥
𝐿
𝑖 + 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 .
(2) If both players regard their eﬀort as SS
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁 ) < 0
)
, the payoﬀs in the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium and in the two Stackelberg equilibria are not Pareto-
rankable. Moreover, the levels of eﬀort are such that 𝑥𝑁𝑖 + 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 ⪋ 𝑥𝐿𝑖 + 𝑥𝐹𝑗 .
(3) If Π𝑗𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁) > 0 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁), the subgame perfect equilibrium (Γ𝑆𝑖) Pareto-
dominates Γ𝑆𝑗 as well as Γ𝑁 . Moreover, the levels of eﬀort are such that
𝑥𝑁𝑖 + 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 > 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗 + 𝑥
𝐹
𝑖 .
Thus, as in the ﬁxed-prize framework, players’ voluntary choice of timing leads to a
second-best eﬃcient outcome. These ﬁndings are based on the following facts: If we
observe sequential play in the SPE, the leader always undercommits eﬀort compared
to the NE. If we observe simultaneous play in equilibrium, both players’ eﬀorts are
- ceteris paribus - lower than their Stackelberg leader eﬀort.
ΓS2
ΓNΓS1
𝑥2
𝑥1
Figure 1
A game of strategic
complements
ΓS2 ΓN
ΓS1
𝑥2
𝑥1
Figure 2
A game of strategic
substitutes
ΓS2
ΓN
ΓS1
𝑥2
𝑥1
Figure 3
A mixed game
In the ﬁrst case
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁) > 0
)
both players’ best response functions enter the Pareto
superior set if we specify it at the NE and which is represented by the grey surface in
ﬁgure (1). The solid convex (concave) curve represents the best response function of
player 1 (2), the dashed concave (convex) curve the iso-payoﬀ curve of player 1 (2)
in the NE of the game. The leader in this case undercommits eﬀort compared to the
NE (cf. lemma (2)) and therefore both Stackelberg equilibria Pareto dominate the
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NE. Moreover, the rent dissipation in Γ𝑆1 and Γ𝑆2 falls short compared to Γ𝑁 . In
the second case
(
Π𝑖𝑖𝑗(x
𝑁 ) < 0
)
both players prefer their NE payoﬀ over their follower
payoﬀ and therefore neither of the best response functions enters the Pareto-superior
set (cf. ﬁgure (2)). That is why Γ𝑁 , Γ𝑆1 and Γ𝑆2 cannot be ranked in a Pareto sense
in this case. Note that the diﬀerence in the rent dissipation between the Cournot-
Nash game and the two sequential move games is indeterminate in this case. Thus,
choosing eﬀort sequentially might lead to social improvement in terms of resources
spent in the contest compared to the SPE of the game.
In the third case (Π112(x
𝑁) > 0 > Π212(x
𝑁)) only player 1 prefers his NE payoﬀ over
his follower payoﬀ (cf. ﬁgure (3)). Thus, only player 1’s best response function
enters the Pareto superior set. Moreover, player 2 undercommits eﬀort. Since in
this case the SPE of Γ˜ is the Stackelberg equilibrium with player 2 being the leader,
Γ𝑆2 Pareto dominates Γ𝑁 as well as Γ𝑆1.
4 Conclusion
Based on the endogenous timing game by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we have
provided a framework for the analysis of endogenous leadership in contests with an
endogenously determined prize. In a stage prior to the contest, the players decided
whether they will exert eﬀort as soon as or as late as possible; and their decision,
to which they are committed, is announced to the other player subsequently. In
this model we have provided a taxonomy of endogenous leadership, based on the
properties of the players’ best response functions as well as on the characteristics
of the prize-production technology. Thus, we were able to generalize the ﬁndings
of Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) regarding the behavior of the
Stackelberg-leader as well as the fact that the SPE of the extended game is always
Pareto-undominated. However, there are diﬀerences compared to the aforemen-
tioned literature. In particular, we were able to establish that the SPE of the
extended game may be represented by a simultaneous move game, and that in a
sequential move SPE the leader might be the favourite of the Cournot-Nash game.
Our work can be extended in various ways:
Regarding the previous work of Yildirim (2005) and Romano and Yildirim (2005)
it would be interesting to establish in which way the ﬁndings of the present paper
would be modiﬁed if one abstains from the assumption that each player is allowed
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to exert eﬀort only once. For instance, in the case were players are evenly matched,
Yildirim (2005) ﬁnds that the outcome of the game is equivalent to a game where
players move simultaneously, although eﬀort might be exerted early and late. There-
fore, allowing the players in our framework to exert eﬀort twice might eliminate the
coordination issue in a game of strategic complements.
Finally, in a rent-seeking framework one may allow for a prize which increases in
the eﬀort of the players. Previous papers dealing with this topic include Cohen et
al. (2008) and Gershkov et al. (2009). Although the prize is assumed to depend
in a positive manner on the eﬀort exerted, the issue of endogenous timing has not
yet been analyzed. Contingent on the properties of the prize-production technology,
this might lead to a game in which the payoﬀ of a player does not react in a mono-
tonic manner on the eﬀort of his competitor. Hence, one might ﬁnd in the NE that
the eﬀort of each player has a positive eﬀect on each player’s payoﬀ, which would
reshape the commitment incentives in the sequential move games.
These extensions are the subject of current research.
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A Appendix - Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
Here, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
A.1.1 Existence of the Nash equilibrium
Given assumptions (1) and (2), the payoﬀ function Π𝑖(x), given by equations (3), is continuous in
(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗). We now show that each player’s payoﬀ function is strictly concave in his own strategy.
The second derivative of the payoﬀ function yields
Π111 (x) = 𝑝11 (x)𝑉 (x) + 2𝑝1 (x)𝑉1 (x) + 𝑝 (x) 𝑉11 (x)− 𝐶111(𝑥1), (A.1)
Π222 (x) = −𝑝22 (x) 𝑉 (x)− 2𝑝2 (x) 𝑉2 (x) + (1− 𝑝 (x))𝑉22 (x)− 𝐶222(𝑥2). (A.2)
Assumptions (1) and (2) together with 𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≥ 0 imply that
Π111 (x) < 0 and Π
2
22 (x) < 0. (A.3)
Therefore the solution to the maximization problem (cf. eq. 5) is unique. Since the payoﬀ is
continuous we can conclude that best response function 𝐵𝑅𝑖(𝑥𝑗) is single-valued and continuous.
The strategy space 𝑋 ∈ ℝ+ is convex. Next, we show that the strategy space is also compact, i.e.
there exists an upper bound on the strategy space. Deﬁne ?¯?1 > 0 such that
Π1(?¯?1, 0) = 0.
Thus, since Π12(x) < 0
Π1(?¯?1, 𝑥2) > Π
1(𝑥1, 𝑥2),
for any 𝑥1 > ?¯?1 and for all 𝑥2 ∈ ℝ+. Therefore for all 𝑥1 > 𝑥1, ?¯?1 strictly dominates 𝑥1. Hence,
after elimination of strictly dominated strategies the strategy space of player 1 becomes [0, ?¯?1]
which is a compact, convex and non-empty set. By symmetry the same argument can be applied
to player 2.
A Nash-equilibrium satisﬁes the following equations:
𝐵𝑅1(𝑥2) = 𝑥1, (A.4)
𝐵𝑅2(𝑥1) = 𝑥2. (A.5)
By substituting (A.5) into (A.4) we see that the NE is given by a ﬁxed point of the composite
function ℬℛ(𝑥1) ≡ 𝐵𝑅1∘𝐵𝑅2 : ℝ+ → ℝ+, whereas the composite function ℬℛ(𝑥1) is a continuous
mapping of a nonempty, convex and compact set into itself. Hence, the existence of a ﬁxed point
directly follows from Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.
A.1.2 Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
We now prove the uniqueness of the NE, i.e. we prove that ℬℛ(𝑥1) has a unique ﬁxed point.
Turning to the best response function, we know that
𝐵𝑅′𝑖(𝑥𝑗) = −
Π𝑖12(x)
Π𝑖𝑖𝑖(x)
. (A.6)
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Because of (A.3), we know that the slope of player 𝑖’s best response function is determined by the
sign of Π𝑖12(x) (cf. eq. 8). Combining Π
𝑖
12(x) with the FOC of player 𝑖 (cf. eq. 6) yields
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
= 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12 +Ω
(
x𝑁
)
, (A.7)
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
= (1 − 𝑝 (x𝑁 ))𝑉12 − Ω (x𝑁) , (A.8)
with
Ω
(
x𝑁
) ≡ 𝑝1 (x𝑁) 𝐶22 (𝑥2)
1− 𝑝 (x𝑁 ) +
𝑝2
(
x𝑁
)
𝐶11 (𝑥1)
𝑝 (x𝑁 )
, (A.9)
which is obviously equal to zero if 𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) = 0. Now, we will split cases.
∙ Case 1: Eﬀorts are strategic complements (substitutes) for both players
We ﬁrst explore the case where eﬀorts are strategic complements (substitutes) for both
players, i.e., we have 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
Π112
(
x𝑁
))
= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
Π212
(
x𝑁
))
. In order to do this we will ﬁrst
show that in this case any NE is locally stable27, i.e.,∣∣∣∣∣Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π111 (x
𝑁 )
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣Π212
(
x𝑁
)
Π222 (x
𝑁 )
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1.
Since 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
Π112
(
x𝑁
))
= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛
(
Π212
(
x𝑁
))
, we have∣∣Π112 (x𝑁)∣∣ ∣∣Π212 (x𝑁)∣∣ = Π112 (x)Π212 (x𝑁)
=
(
Ω
(
x𝑁
)
+ 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
)) (−Ω (x𝑁)+ (1− 𝑝 (x𝑁))𝑉12 (x𝑁 ))
Implementing 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
= max
{
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
, 1− 𝑝 (x𝑁)} leads to
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π212
(
x𝑁
) ≤ (Ω (x𝑁)+ 𝑝 (x𝑁 )𝑉12 (x𝑁)) (−Ω (x𝑁)+ 𝑝 (x𝑁 )𝑉12 (x𝑁 ))
=
(
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
))2 − (Ω (x𝑁 ))2
<
(
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
))2
.
Using (A.1) and (A.2), and implementing 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
= min
{
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
, 1− 𝑝 (x𝑁)}, we deduce
Π111
(
x𝑁
)
< 𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉11
(
x𝑁
) ≤ 𝑝 (x𝑁 ) 𝑉11 (x𝑁) < 0,
and
Π222
(
x𝑁
)
<
(
1− 𝑝 (x𝑁 ))𝑉22 (x𝑁) ≤ 𝑝 (x𝑁) 𝑉22 (x𝑁) < 0.
Thus, combining the preceding inequalities and assumption (3) yields local stability of the
NE, i.e.∣∣∣∣∣Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π111 (x
𝑁 )
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
Π122 (x
𝑁 )
∣∣∣∣∣ = Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π111 (x
𝑁 )
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
Π122 (x
𝑁 )
<
(
𝑝
(
x𝑁
)
𝑉12
(
x𝑁
))2(
𝑝 (x𝑁 )
)2
𝑉11 (x𝑁 )𝑉22 (x𝑁 )
≤ 1.
Subsequently we will show that local stability implies uniqueness of the NE. Following
the work of Skaperdas (1992, p. 737) we know that local stability rules out the existence of
equilibria which are limit points of other equilibria. That is, there are ﬁnitely many equilibria
which are isolated. Hence, if (𝑥𝑁1 , 𝑥
𝑁
2 ) is an equilibrium then there is an 𝜀 ≡ 𝜀(𝑥𝑁1 , 𝑥𝑁2 ) such
27See Vives (2001), p. 51 for a discussion on local stability.
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that for all 𝑥∗𝑖 ∈ [𝑥𝑁𝑖 − 𝜀, 𝑥𝑁𝑖 + 𝜀], with 𝑖 = 1, 2, (𝑥∗1, 𝑥∗2) is not an equilibrium. Since
ℬℛ′(𝑥𝑁1 ) ≡ (𝐵𝑅1 ∘𝐵𝑅2)′(𝑥𝑁1 ) = 𝐵𝑅′1
(
𝐵𝑅2(𝑥
𝑁
1 )
)
𝐵𝑅′2(𝑥
𝑁
1 )
⇔ ℬℛ′(𝑥𝑁1 ) =
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π111 (x
𝑁 )
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
Π222 (x
𝑁 )
⇔ 0 < ℬℛ′(𝑥𝑁1 ) < 1. (A.10)
∙ Case 2: Eﬀorts are strategic complements (substitutes) for player 𝑖 and strategic
substitutes (complements) for player 𝑗.
Next, we turn to the case where eﬀorts are strategic complements for one player and strategic
substitutes for the other player. In this case we can rule out a dense set of equilibria due to
the fact that 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐵𝑅′1(𝑥2)) ∕= 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐵𝑅′2(𝑥1)). Moreover, in this case
ℬℛ′(𝑥𝑁1 ) =
Π112
(
x𝑁
)
Π111 (x
𝑁 )
Π212
(
x𝑁
)
Π222 (x
𝑁 )
⇔ ℬℛ′(𝑥𝑁1 ) < 0. (A.11)
The ﬁnal step is to show that in either case we can rule out the existence of another equilibrium.
Suppose that (𝑥𝑎1 , 𝑥
𝑎
2) and (𝑥
𝑏
1, 𝑥
𝑏
2) are two isolated equilibria, with 𝑥
𝑎
1 < 𝑥
𝑏
1, and no equilibrium
exists for 𝑥1 ∈ (𝑥𝑎1 , 𝑥𝑏1). Using (A.10) and (A.11) and starting from (𝑥𝑎1 , 𝑥𝑎2) leads to
𝑥1 > ℬℛ(𝑥1) ∀𝑥1 ∈ (𝑥𝑎1 , 𝑥𝑏1). (A.12)
Consequently, starting from (𝑥𝑏1, 𝑥
𝑏
2),
𝑥1 < ℬℛ(𝑥1) ∀𝑥1 ∈ (𝑥𝑎1 , 𝑥𝑏1), (A.13)
which contradicts (A.12). Thus, there exists a unique NE.
□
A.2 Proof of lemma 2 (Comparison of the levels of eﬀort I)
By deﬁnitions of the Stackelberg and the Nash equilibriums, we have
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖
)) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥𝑁𝑗 ) . (A.14)
The leader of the Stackelberg game always has a utility level superior or equal to the utility level
obtained at the Nash equilibrium. The deﬁnition of the Nash equilibrium induces
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
)
= max
𝑥𝑖
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥𝑁𝑗 ) .
Assuming that 𝑥𝑁𝑗 < 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 then involves
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥𝑁𝑗 ) > Π𝑖 (𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥𝐹𝑗 ) ,
since eﬀorts are plain substitutes
(
Π𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0
)
. But this contradicts the relation (A.14). There-
fore, we deduce that
Π𝑖𝑗(x) < 0⇔ 𝑥𝑁𝑗 > 𝑥𝐹𝑗 . (A.15)
□
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A.3 Proof of lemma 3 (Comparison of the levels of eﬀort II)
Let the function Ψ𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) be
Ψ𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) = Π
𝑖
𝑖
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
)
+Π𝑖𝑗
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
) 𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
. (A.16)
This function corresponds to the ﬁrst derivative of the leader payoﬀ function. For 𝑥𝐿𝑖 , we obtain the
FOC of the leader, that is Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖
)
= 0. Since Ψ′𝑖 (𝑥𝑖) < 0 we ﬁnd that the Stackelberg equilibrium
exists and is unique. Next, we split cases.
∙ If Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 eﬀorts are strategic complements for the player 𝑗 at the Nash equilibrium.
We deduce that
𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
> 0 at 𝑥𝑁𝑖 , i.e., the best response function of player 𝑗 is increasing
at the Nash equilibrium. We thus have
Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖
)
= Π𝑖𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 )
)
+Π𝑖𝑗
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 )
) 𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= Π𝑖𝑗
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 )
) 𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
< 0 = Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖
)
,
since by deﬁnition Π𝑖𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗 (𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 )
)
= 0, Π𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0 and
𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
> 0. The decreasing of
Ψ𝑖
(
x𝑁
)
in 𝑥𝑖 involves
Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖
)
< Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖
)⇔ 𝑥𝑁𝑖 > 𝑥𝐿𝑖 . (A.17)
∙ If Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0, then we have
𝑑𝑥𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖)
𝑑𝑥𝑖
< 0 at the Nash equilibrium, and consequently
Ψ𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖
)
> 0⇔ 𝑥𝑁𝑖 < 𝑥𝐿𝑖 . (A.18)
□
A.4 Proof of lemma 4
(First-mover advantage and second-mover incentive)
We consider two cases:
∙ If Π𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0 and Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0, the rankings are: 𝑥𝐹𝑖 > 𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 and 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 > 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗 . We have
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐹𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗
)
= max
𝑥𝑖
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗
) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥𝐿𝑗 )
> Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
)
,
where the ﬁrst inequality results from the follower’s maximization program, and the second
from the fact that 𝑥𝐿𝑗 < 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 and Π
𝑖
𝑗(x) < 0. Player 𝑖 then has a second-mover incentive.
∙ If Π𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0 and Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0, the ranking are: 𝑥𝐹𝑖 > 𝑥
𝑁
𝑖 and 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗 < 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗 . We have
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗
) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥𝑁𝑗 )
= max
𝑥𝑖
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑖, 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
) ≥ Π𝑖 (𝑥𝐹𝑖 , 𝑥𝑁𝑗 )
> Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐹𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗
)
,
where the ﬁrst inequality results from (A.14), the second from the deﬁnition of the Nash
maximization program, and the third from the fact that 𝑥𝑁𝑗 < 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗 and Π
𝑖
𝑗(x) < 0. Player 𝑖
then has a ﬁrst-mover advantage and a second-mover dis-incentive, since Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
)
>
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐹𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗
)
.□
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A.5 Proof of proposition 5 (SPE)
Each player has a ﬁrst-mover incentive, i.e. Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗
)
> Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
)
(cf. eq. A.14). In order to
determine the SPE, we will utilize our previous ﬁndings.
∙ If we have a game of SC (Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 for both players), then given lemma 4, both players
have a second-mover and ﬁrst-mover incentive. Consequently Γ𝑆𝑖 and Γ𝑆𝑗 are SPE of the
extended game.
∙ If we have a game of SS (Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
< 0 for both players), then given lemma 4, both players
have a ﬁrst-mover advantage and a second-mover incentive. Consequently Γ𝑁 is the unique
SPE of the extended game.
∙ If we have a mixed game (Π𝑗𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
> 0 > Π𝑖𝑖𝑗
(
x𝑁
)
), we have from preceding computations{
Π𝑗
(
𝑥𝐹𝑗 , 𝑥
𝐿
𝑖
)
> Π𝑗
(
𝑥𝑁𝑗 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑖
)
Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐿𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐹
𝑗
)
> Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝑁𝑖 , 𝑥
𝑁
𝑗
)
> Π𝑖
(
𝑥𝐹𝑖 , 𝑥
𝐿
𝑗
)
.
To move early is a dominant strategy for player 𝑖 since he has a ﬁrst-mover advantage and
a second-mover dis-incentive. Player 𝑗 has a second-mover advantage. Therefore, given the
dominant strategy of player 𝑖, player 𝑗 will choose to move late. Consequently Γ𝑆𝑖 is the
unique SPE of the extended game.
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